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Abstract—We study the capacity of secret-key agreement over
a wiretap channel with state parameters. The transmitter com-
municates to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper over
a discrete memoryless wiretap channel with a memoryless state
sequence. The transmitter and the legitimate receiver generate
a shared secret key, that remains secret from the eavesdropper.
No public discussion channel is available. The state sequence
is known noncausally to the transmitter. We derive lower and
upper bounds on the secret-key capacity. The lower bound
involves constructing a common state reconstruction sequence at
the legitimate terminals and binning the set of reconstruction
sequences to obtain the secret-key. For the special case of
Gaussian channels with additive interference (secret-keys from
dirty paper channel) our bounds differ by 0.5 bit/symbol and
coincide in the high signal-to-noise-ratio and high interference-
to-noise-ratio regimes. For the case when the legitimate receiver
is also revealed the state sequence, we establish that our lower
bound achieves the the secret-key capacity. In addition, for
this special case, we also propose another scheme that attains
the capacity and requires only causal side information at the
transmitter and the receiver.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret keys are a fundamental requirement for any ap-
plication involving secure communication or computation.
An information theoretic approach to secret key generation
between two or more terminals was pioneered in [3], [4]
and subsequently extended in [5]–[8]. In the setup considered
in these works, the transmitter communicates to a legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper over a memoryless broadcast
channel and is interested in generating a secret key shared
with the legitimate receiver. The legitimate terminals can also
exchange an unlimited number of messages over a public
channel. There has been a significant interest in developing
practical approaches for generating shared secret keys between
two or more terminals based on such techniques, see e.g., [9]–
[16] and references therein.
In the present work, we study the secret key agreement
capacity over a broadcast channel controlled by a random
state variable. The importance of studying channels with
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state parameters [17]–[19] has become increasingly evident
in recent times due a variety of applications including fading
channels [20], broadcast channels [21] and digital watermak-
ing [22]. For example in fading channels, the state vari-
able could model the instantaneous fading coefficient of the
channel. In broadcast channels the state sequence models an
interfering message to another receiver while in watermarking
systems the state sequence represents a host sequence on
which information message needs to be embedded. Clearly
depending on the application the state sequence may be
known to either the sender or the receivers or both. In this
paper, unless otherwise stated, we assume that the entire
state sequence is known to the sender noncausally. As will
be discussed, the seemingly more general case when each
receiver also has (a possibly noisy) side information can be
easily incorporated in this model. Some of our results only
require causal transmitter side information although we note
in advance that we do not consider this problem in detail.
In the present paper we only focus on the case when there
is no discussion channel available. We point the reader to
our conference papers [1], [2] for some results on the case
when a public discussion channel is available. Notice that our
setup differs from [23]–[25] that study the wiretap channel
with state parameters and require that the transmitter send a
confidential message to the receiver and build on the wiretap
channel model [26]. Our results indicate that the achievable
secret-key rate can be significantly higher compared to the
results in [23]–[25]. Recently an improved lower bound for the
wiretap channel with causal state information at the transmitter
and receiver has been reported in [27]. Interestingly it uses a
block markov coding scheme, where a secret key is generated
in each block as an intermediate step.
After the conference papers [1], [2] on which this paper
is based appeared, the authors became aware about a re-
cent work [28] where a similar secret-key agreement scheme
over channels with noncausal channel state information is
presented. This scheme is used in constructing a coding
scheme that provides a tradeoff between secret-key and secret-
message transmission. The paper [28] however does not fully
explore the problem of secret key agreement over wiretap
channels with state parameters. In particular to the best of
our knowledge, it does not have the results in the present
paper such as an upper bound on the secret-key capacity, the
asymptotic optimality of the lower bound for the Gaussian
case or the secret-key capacity for the case of symmetric CSI.
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Fig. 1. Wiretap channel controlled by a state parameter. The channel transition
probability pyr,ye|x,s is controlled by a state parameter s. The entire source
sequence sn is known to the sender but not to the receiver or the eavesdropper.
The sender and receiver generate a secret key κ at the end of the transmission.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Channel Model
The channel model has three terminals — a sender, a
receiver and an eavesdropper. The sender communicates with
the other two terminals over a discrete-memoryless-channel
controlled by a random state parameter. The transition proba-
bility of the channel is pyr,ye|x,s(·) where x denotes the channel
input symbol, whereas yr and ye denote the channel output
symbols at the receiver and the eavesdropper respectively. The
symbol s denotes a state variable that controls the channel
transition probability. We assume that it is independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) from a distribution ps(·) in each
channel use. Further, the entire sequence sn is known to the
sender before the communication begins.
As explained in section II-C the model generalizes easily
to take into account correlated side information sequence at
each of the receivers.
B. Secret-Key Capacity
A length n encoder is defined as follows. The sender sam-
ples a random variables mx from the conditional distribution
pmx |sn(·|sn). The encoding function produces a channel input
sequence
xn = fn(mx , s
n) (1)
and transmits it over n uses of the channel. At time i the
symbol xi is transmitted and the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper observe output symbols yri and yei respectively,
sampled from the conditional distribution pyr,ye|x,s(·). The
sender and receiver compute secret keys
κ = gn(mx , s
n), l = hn(y
n
r ). (2)
A rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of encoding
functions such that for some sequence εn that vanishes as
n→∞, we have that Pr(κ 6= l) ≤ εn and
1
n
H(κ) ≥ R− εn, (3)
and
1
n
I(κ; yne ) ≤ εn. (4)
The largest achievable rate is the secret-key capacity.
C. Extended Model
In our proposed model we are assuming the state variable
is only known to the transmitter and not to the receiving
terminals. A more general model involves a state variable that
can be decomposed into s = (st, sr, se, s0) where the sequence
s
n
t is revealed noncausally to the sender whereas snr and sne
are revealed to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
respectively while sn0 is not revealed to any of the terminals. It
turns out that the model in section II-A includes this extended
model. The secret-key capacity for this new model is identical
to the secret-key capacity of a particular model in section II-A
defined by: y¯r = (yr, sr) and y¯e = (ye, se) and the channel
transition probability
p(y¯r, y¯e|st, x) =
∑
s0
p(yr, ye|s0, sr, se, st, x)p(s0, sr, se|st).
(5)
The equivalence can be established by noting that the modified
channel preserves the same knowledge of the side information
sequences as the original problem, the rate and equivocation
terms only depend on the joint distribution p(y¯nr , y¯ne , xn, snt )
and for any input distribution p(xn|snt ), the extended channel
satisfies
p(y¯nr , y¯
n
e |xn, snt ) =
n∏
i=1
p(y¯ri, y¯ei|xi, sti), (6)
where each term on the right hand side of (6) obeys (5).
We omit a detailed proof in interest of space and point
to the reader to [29, pp. 17—25] [30, Chapter 7, pp. 7-54]
for an analogous observation. Note that our model inherently
uses the asymmetry in channel state knowledge between
the eavesdropper and the legitimate receiver for secret key
generation. While as discussed in this subsection, it can be
easily extended to incorporate receiver side information, for
simplicity in exposition we will suppress the availability of
side information at the receivers.
III. MAIN RESULTS
We summarize the main results of this paper in this section.
A. Capacity Bounds
We first provide an achievable rate (lower bound) on the
secret-key capacity.
Theorem 1: An achievable secret-key rate is
R− = max
pu ,px|s,u
I(u; yr)− I(u; ye), (7)
where the maximization is over all auxiliary random variables
u that satisfy the Markov condition u → (x , s)→ (yr, ye) and
furthermore satisfy the constraint that
I(u; yr)− I(u; s) ≥ 0. (8)
The intuition behind the coding scheme is as follows. Upon
observing sn, the sender communicates the best possible
reproduction un of the state sequence to the receiver Now
both the sender and the receiver observe a common sequence
un. The set of all codewords un is binned into 2nR− bins
3and the bin-index is declared to be the secret key. Note
that the problem of communicating a state sequence with
common knowledge to the receiver is studied in [31], [32].
This setup requires that the reconstruction sequence satisfy a
certain distortion measure with respect to the state sequence. In
contrast the common reconstruction sequence in this problem
is an intermediate step used to generate a common secret key.
While we do not have a matching upper bound to Theorem 1
the following result provides an upper bound to the secret-key
capacity that is amenable to numerical evaluation.
Theorem 2: The secret-key capacity is upper bounded by
C ≤ R+, where
R+ = min
pyr,ye|x,s∈P
max
px|s
I(x , s; yr|ye), (9)
where P denotes all the joint distributions p⋆
yr,ye|x,s that have
the same marginal distribution as the original channel.
The intuition behind the upper bound is as follows. We
create a degraded channel by revealing the output of the
eavesdropper to the legitimate receiver. We further assume a
channel with two inputs (xn, sn) i.e., the state sequence sn
is not arbitrary, but rather a part of the input codeword with
distribution ps . The secrecy capacity of the resulting wiretap
channel is then given by I(x , s; yr|ye).
Note that the problem of secret-key agreement is differ-
ent from the secret-message transmission problem considered
in [23]–[25]. This is because the secret-key can be an arbitrary
function of the state sequence (known only to the transmitter)
whereas the secret-message needs to be independent function
of the state sequence. For comparison, the best known lower
bound on the secret-message transmission problem is stated
below.
Proposition 1: [23]–[25] An achievable secret message
rate for the wiretap channel with noncausal transmiter channel
state information (CSI) is
R = max
pu ,px|u,s
I(u; yr)−max (I(u; s), I(u; ye)) . (10)
We note that the secret-key rate (7) is in general strictly better
than the secret-message rate (10).
B. Secret Keys from Dirty Paper Coding
We study the Gaussian case under an average power
constraint. The channel to the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper is expressed as:
yr = x + s + zr
ye = x + s + ze,
(11)
where zr ∼ N (0, 1) and ze ∼ N (0, 1 + ∆) denote the
additive white Gaussian nose and are assumed to be sampled
independently. The state parameter s ∼ N (0, Q) is also
sampled i.i.d. at each time instance and is independent of both
zr and ze. Furthermore, the channel input satisfies an average
power constraint E[x2] ≤ P . We assume sn to be noncausally
known to the sender but not to any other terminals.
Thus the parameter P denotes the signal-to-noise ratio, the
parameter Q denotes the interference-to-noise-ratio, whereas
∆ denotes the degradation level of the eavesdropper. We now
provide lower and upper bounds on the secret-key capacity1.
We limit our analysis to the case when P ≥ 1.
Proposition 2: Assuming that P ≥ 1, a lower bound on the
secret-key agreement capacity is capacity is given by,
R− =
1
2
log
(
1 +
∆(P +Q+ 2ρ
√
PQ)
P +Q+ 1 +∆+ 2ρ
√
PQ
)
, (12)
where |ρ| < 1 and
P (1− ρ2) = 1− 1
P +Q+ 1
. (13)
Proposition 3: An upper bound on the secret-key capacity
is given by,
R+ =
1
2
log
(
1 +
∆(P +Q+ 2
√
PQ)
P +Q+ 1 +∆+ 2
√
PQ
)
(14)
It can be readily verified that the upper and lower bounds are
close in several interesting regimes. In Fig. 2 we numerically
plot these bounds and state some properties below. We omit
the proof due to space constraints.
Proposition 4: The upper and lower bounds on secret-
capacity satisfy the following
R+ −R− ≤ 1
2
bit/symbol (15)
lim
P→∞
R+ −R− = 0 (16)
lim
Q→∞
R+ −R− = 0 (17)
C. Symmetric CSI
Consider the special case where the state sequence s is also
revealed to the legitimate receiver. In this case we have a
complete characterization of the secret-key capacity.
Theorem 3: The secret-key capacity for the channel model
in section II-A when the state sequence sn is also revealed to
the decoder is given by
Csym = max
pu|s(·)px|u,s(·)
I(u; yr|s)− I(u; ye|s) +H(s|ye), (18)
where the maximization is over all auxilary random variables
u that obey the Markov chain u → (x , s) → (yr, ye).
Additionally it suffices to limit the cardinality of the auxiliary
variable to |S|(1 + |X |) in (18).
The achievability in (18) follows from (7) by augmenting
y¯r = (yr, s). Observe that (8) is redundant as I(u; yr, s) −
I(u; s) ≥ 0 holds. Furthermore the expression in (7) can be
simplified as follows
R− = max
pu ,px|s,u
I(u; yr, s)− I(u; ye)
= max
pu ,px|s,u
I(u; yr|s)− I(u; ye|s) + I(s; u|ye) (19)
= max
pu ,px|s,u
I(u; yr|s)− I(u; ye|s) +H(s|ye) (20)
where the last relation follows by noting that if u is an optimal
choice in (19) then by selecting u⋆ = (u, s) will leave the
1Interestingly in the presence of public discussion, we have been able to
characterize the secret-key capacity [1].
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Fig. 2. Bounds on the capacity of the “secret-keys from dirty paper” channel. In the left figure, we plot the bounds on capacity as a function of SNR (dB)
when Q = 10 dB and ∆ = 10 dB. The upper-most curve is the capacity with public-discussion [1] whereas the next two curves denote the upper and lower
bounds on the capacity as stated in Prop. 3 and Prop. 2. The dotted curve is the secret message transmission lower bound (10) evaluated for a jointly Gaussian
input distribution. In the right figure we vary the degradation level at the eavesdropper ∆ (in dB) and compute the secret-key rates for P = 2 and Q = 2.
The upper-most curve is the secret-key capacity with public discussion [1], the next two curves are the upper and the lower bounds, whereas the dotted curve
is the secret message transmission rate evaluated for Gaussian inputs.
difference in the two mutual information terms unchanged
but increase the second term H(s|ye) as specified in (20).
Notice that (20) is identical to (18). The converse follows
by an application of Csiszar’s Lemma and is provided in
section VI-B
We provide another achievability scheme for Theorem 3
that only requires causal knowledge of sn at the encoder. The
scheme is based on the following interpretation of (18). The
term I(u; yr|s)−I(u; ye|s) is the rate of a multiplexed wiretap
codebook constructed assuming that all the three terminals
have knowledge of sn. The second term H(s|ye) is the rate of
the additional secret key that can be produced by exploiting
the fact that sn is only known to the sender and the legitimate
terminal. This scheme is causal since the multiplexed code
uses only current state to decide which codebook to use.
Furthermore, since the state is known to the sender and
receiver, the second term is also causal.
We note that the capacity expression (18) captures an
interesting tension between two competing forces in choosing
the optimal distribution. To maximize the contribution of the
rate obtained from the multiplexed wiretap codebook, it is
desirable to select u to be strongly correlated with s. However
doing so will leak more information about s to the wiretapper
and reduce the rate contribution of the second codebook. To
maximize the contribution of the common state sequence, we
need to select an input that masks the state sequence from the
eavesdropper [33]. We illustrate this tradeoff via an example
in section III-D.
Finally it can be easily verified that the the expression (18)
simplifies in the following special case.
Corollary 1: Suppose that for each s ∈ S the channel
pyr,ye|s=s,x(yr, ye|s, x) is such that the eavesdropper’s channel
is less noisy compared to the legitimate receiver’s channel.
Then the secret-key capacity with sn revealed to both the
legitimate terminals is
C = max
px|s
H(s|ye). (21)
Intuitively, when the wiretap channel cannot contribute to the
secrecy, (21) states that transmitter should select an input that
masks the state from the output as much as possible.
D. Symmetric CSI: Numerical Example
It can be easily seen that for the dirty paper coding example
in section III-B, the secret-key capacity when s is also revealed
to the legitimate receiver is infinity. More generally higher the
entropy of s, higher will be the gains in the secret-key capacity
with symmetric CSI. In this section illustrate the secret-key
rate for an on-off channel for the receivers:
yr = srx + zr
ye = sex + ze,
(22)
where both sr, se ∈ {0, 1}, the random variables are mutu-
ally independent and Pr(sr = 0) = Pr(se = 0) = 0.5.
Furthermore we assume that sr is revealed to the legitimate
terminals, whereas the eavesdropper is revealed y˜e = (se, ye).
The noise random variables are mutually independent, zero
mean and unit variance Gaussian random variables and the
power constraint is that E[x2] ≤ P .
We evaluate the secret-key rate expression for Gaussian
inputs i.e., u = x ∼ N (0, P0) when sr = 0 and u = x ∼
N (0, P1) when sr = 1. Further to satisfy the average power
constraint we have that P0 + P1 ≤ 2P . An achievable rate
from Theorem 3
R = I(x ; yr|sr)− I(x ; y˜e|sr) +H(sr|y˜e) (23)
= I(x ; yr|sr)− I(x ; ye, se|sr) +H(sr|se, ye) (24)
=
1
8
log(1 + P1) +
1
2
Eye [H(p(ye), 1− p(ye))] +
1
2
, (25)
50.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
P0/P
R
at
e 
(b/
s/H
z)
Fig. 3. The achievable secret-key rate as a fraction of power allocated to the
state sr = 0 and SNR = 17 dB. The solid curve denotes the secret-key rate,
the dashed curve denotes the rate of the secret-message, while the dotted curve
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Fig. 4. Optimal fraction of power that must be allocated to the state sr = 0
to maximize the secret-key rate with Gaussian inputs. The curve marked with
a (×) denotes the case of public discussion while the other curve denotes the
case of no public discussion.
where we have introduced
p(ye) =
Nye(0, P0 + 1)
Nye(0, P0 + 1) +Nye(0, P1 + 1)
(26)
the aposterior distribution Pr(sr = 0|ye) and the notation
Nye(0, σ2) denotes the zero mean Gaussian distribution with
variance σ2 evaluated at ye and where (25) follows through a
straightforward computation.
In Fig. 3 we numerically evaluate this rate for SNR = 17
dB. For comparison we also plot the corresponding rate with
public discussion [2]
Rdisc =
1
8
log(1+2P1)+
1
2
Eye [H(p(ye), 1−p(ye))]+
1
2
. (27)
In Fig. 3 the solid curves show the secret key rate with
and without public discussion, while the dashed curve is
the entropy H(sr|se = 1, ye) and the dotted curve denotes
contribution of the wiretap code. Note that in general there is a
tradeoff between these two terms. To maximize the conditional
entropy we set P0 = P1 = P/2, while to maximize the wiretap
codebook rate we need to set P0 = 0 and P1 = P . The
resulting secret-key rate is maximized by selecting a power
allocation that balances these two terms. The optimum fraction
of power transmitted in the state sr = 0 as a function of the
signal to noise ratio is shown in Fig. 4. Note that no power is
transmitted when the signal-to-noise ratio is below ≈ −2.5dB.
In this regime the channels are sufficiently noisy so that
H(sr|ye, se = 1) ≈ 1 even with P0 = 0 and hence all the
available power is used for transmitting the secret-message. As
the signal-to-noise ratio increases more information regarding
sr gets leaked to the eavesdropper and to compensate for
this effect, a non-zero fraction of power is transmitted when
sr = 0.
IV. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH NONCAUSAL
TRANSMITTER CSI
In this section we provide Proofs of Theorem 1 and 2 i.e.,
the coding scheme and the upper bound for the secret key
agreement problem.
);(
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Fig. 5. Codebook for the secret key agreement problem. A total of ≈ 2nI(u;yr)
codewords are generated i.i.d. pu(·) and partitions into 2nR bins so that thare
are 2nI(u;ye) sequences in each bin. Given sn, a jointly typical sequence un
is selected and its bin index constitutes the secret key.
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The coding theorem involves constructing a common se-
quence un at the legitimate terminals and using it to generate
a secret key.
1) Codebook Generation: Assume that the input distribu-
tion is such that I(u; yr) > I(u; s) as required in Theorem 1.
Let εn be a sequence of non-negative numbers that goes to
zero such that 2εn < I(u; yr)− I(u; s).
• Generate a total of T = 2n(I(u;yr)−2εn) sequences. Each
sequence is sampled i.i.d. from a distribution pu(·). Label
them un1 , . . . , unT .
• Select a rate R = I(u; yr)− I(u; ye)− εn and randomly
partition the set sequences in the previous step into 2nR
bins so that there are 2n(I(u;ye)−εn) sequences in each
bin.
2) Encoding:
• Given a state sequence sn the encoder selects a sequence
un randomly from the list of all possible sequences that
are jointly typical with sn. Let the index of this sequence
be L.
6• At time i = 1, 2, . . . , n the encoder transmits symbol xi
generated by sampling the distribution px|u,s(·|ui, si).
3) Secret-key generation:
• The decoder upon observing ynr finds a sequence un
jointly typical with ynr .
• Both encoder and the decoder declare the bin-index of
un to be the secret-key.
4) Error Probability Analysis: An error occurs only if one
of the following events occur:
E1 = {(un(l), sn) /∈ T nε (u, s) for all 1 ≤ l ≤ T } (28)
E2 = {(un(L), ynr ) /∈ T nε (u, yr)} (29)
E3 = {(un(l), ynr ) ∈ T nε (u, yr) for some l 6= L} (30)
Since the number of sequences T > 2nI(u;s) it follows from
the Covering Lemma [30, Chapter 3] that Pr(E1) → 0 as
n → ∞. Furthermore let Ec1 = {(un, sn, xn) ∈ T nε′ (u, s, x)}
and Pr(Ec1) → 1 as n → ∞ for any ε′ < ε. Since
p(ynr |un(L), xn, sn) =
∏n
i=1 p(yri|ui, xi, si) it follows from
the conditional typicality Lemma [30, Chapter 2] that Pr(E2∩
Ec1) → 0 as n → ∞. Finally since every un(l) is generated
i.i.d. pu(ui) and is independent of ynr for l 6= L it follows
from the Packing Lemma [30, Chapter 3] that Pr(E3)→ 0 if
T < 2nI(u;yr).
5) Secrecy Analysis: We need to show that for the proposed
encoder and decoder, the equivocation at the eavesdropper
satisfies
1
n
H(κ|yne ) = I(u; yr)− I(u; ye) + on(1), (31)
where on(1) is a term that goes to zero as n→∞.
Note that while the key κ in general can be a function of
(sn,mx) as indicated in (1), in our coding scheme the secret
key is a deterministic functino of un and hence we have
1
n
H(κ|yne ) =
1
n
H(κ, un|yne )−
1
n
H(un|yne , κ)
=
1
n
H(un|yne )−
1
n
H(un|yne , κ)
=
1
n
H(un|yne )− εn
where the last step follows from the fact that there are
T0 = 2
n(I(u;ye)−εn) sequences in each bin. Again applying
the packing lemma we can show that with high probability
the eavesdropper uniquely finds the codeword un(L) jointly
typical with yne in this set and hence Fano’s Inequality implies
that
1
n
H(un|yne , κ) ≤ εn.
It remains to show that
1
n
H(un|yne ) ≥ I(u; yr)− I(u; ye)− on(1).
Using the chain rule of the joint entropy we have
1
n
H(un|yne ) =
1
n
H(un) +
1
n
H(yne |un)−
1
n
H(yne ) (32)
=
1
n
H(un) +
1
n
H(yne |un, sn)−
1
n
H(yne ) +
1
n
I(sn; yne |un).
(33)
We now appropriately bound each term in (33). First note that
since the sequence un is uniformly distributed among the set
of all possible codeword sequences, it follows that
1
n
H(un) =
1
n
log2 |C|
= I(u; yr)− 2εn (34)
Next, as verified below, the channel to the eavesdropper
(un, sn)→ yne , is memoryless:
pyne |un,sn(y
n
e |un, sn)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
pyne |un,sn,xn(y
n
e |un, sn, xn)pxn|un,sn(xn|un, sn)
=
∑
xn∈Xn
n∏
i=1
pye|u,s,x(ye,i|ui, si, xi)px|u,s(xi|ui, si)
=
n∏
i=1
∑
xi∈X
pye|u,s,x(ye,i|ui, si, xi)px|u,s(xi|ui, si)
=
n∏
i=1
pye|u,s(ye,i|ui, si)
The second step above follows from the fact that the channel
is memoryless and the symbol xi at time i is generated as a
function of (ui, si). Hence we have that
1
n
H(yne |sn, un) =
n∑
i=1
H(ye,i|si, ui). (35)
Furthermore note that
1
n
H(yne ) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(yei). (36)
Finally, in order to lower bound the term I(sn; yne |un) we
let J to be a random variable which equals 1 if (sn, un) are
jointly typical. Note that Pr(J = 1) = 1− on(1).
1
n
I(sn; yne |un) =
1
n
H(sn|un)− 1
n
H(sn|un, yne )
≥ 1
n
H(sn|un, J = 1)Pr(J = 1)− 1
n
H(sn|un, yne )
≥ 1
n
H(sn|un, J = 1)− 1
n
H(sn|un, yne )− on(1)
≥ H(s|u) − 1
n
H(sn|un, yne )− on(1) (37)
≥ H(s|u) − 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(si|ui, ye,i)− on(1) (38)
where (37) follows from the fact that sn is an i.i.d. sequence
and hence conditioned on the fact that (sn, un) is a pair of
typical sequence there are 2nH(s|u)−non(1) possible sequences
sn.
Substituting (34), (35), (36) and (38) in the lower bound (33)
and using the fact that as n → ∞, the summation converges
7to the mean values,
1
n
H(κ|yne )
= I(u; yr) +H(ye|u, s) −H(ye) +H(s|u)−H(s|u, ye)−on(1)
= I(u; yr)− I(ye; s|u)− I(ye; u) + I(ye; s|u) − on(1)
= I(u; yr)− I(ye; u)− on(1)
as required.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
A sequence of length-n code satisfies:
1
n
H(κ|ynr ) ≤ εn (39)
1
n
H(κ|yne ) ≥
1
n
H(κ)− εn (40)
where (39) follows from the Fano’s inequality since the
receiver is able to recover the secret-key κ given ynr and (40)
is a consequence of the secrecy constraint. Furthermore, note
that κ→ (xn, sn)→ (ynr , yne ) holds as the encoder generates
the secret key κ. Thus we can bound the rate R = 1
n
H(κ) as
below:
nR ≤ I(κ; ynr |yne ) + 2nεn
≤ I(κ, sn, xn; ynr |yne ) + 2nεn
≤ I(sn, xn; ynr |yne ) +H(κ|sn, xn) + 2nεn
= I(sn, xn; ynr |yne ) + 3nεn (41)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(si, xi; yr,i|ye,i) + 3nεn (42)
≤ nI(x , s; yr|ye) + 3nεn (43)
where (41) follows from the Fano Inequality because κ can
be obtained from (xn, sn), (42) from from the fact that the
channel is memoryless and the last step follows from the
concavity of the conditional entropy term I(x , s; yr|ye) in the
input distribution px,s (see e.g., [34]).
Finally since the secret-key capacity only depends on the
marginal distribution of the channel and not on the joint
distribution we can minimize over all joint distributions with
fixed marginal distributions.
V. GAUSSIAN CASE
We develop the lower and upper bounds on secret-key
agreement capacity for the Gaussian channel model.
A. Proof of Prop. 2
Recall that s ∼ N (0, Q). Choose x ∼ N (0, P ) to be a
Gaussian random variable independent of s and let E[xs] =
ρ
√
PQ. Select u = x + αs and the lower bound follows by
evaluating
R = I(u; yr)− I(u; ye)
= h(u|ye)− h(u|yr)
p1
s
xp
 
Transmitted Point
Received Point
Uncertainty sphere 
at eavesdropper
xd
x
PQQP  2  
Fig. 6. Secret-key agreement codebook for the dirty paper channel. The
transmit sequence xn is selected so that un = xn + sn is a sequence in the
codebook C. The smaller spheres above denote the noise uncertainty at the
legitimate receiver. Their centres are the codewords in C. The larger sphere
denotes the noise uncertainty at the eavesdropper. Our binning of smaller
spheres guarantees that the noise uncertainty sphere of the eavesdropper has
all possible messages, resulting in (asymptotically) perfect equivocation.
Further evaluating each of the terms above with u = x + αs,
note that
h(u|ye) = h(x + αs|x + s + ze) =
1
2
log 2pie
(
P + α2Q+ 2αρ
√
PQ −
(P + αQ+ (1 + α)ρ
√
PQ)2
P +Q+ 1 +∆+ 2ρ
√
PQ
)
and
h(u|yr) = h(x + αs|x + s + zr) =
1
2
log 2pie
(
P + α2Q+ 2αρ
√
PQ −
(P + αQ+ ρ(1 + α)
√
PQ)2
P +Q+ 1 + 2
√
PQ
)
.
This yields that
R =
1
2
log

1 + ∆
1 + PQ(α−1)
2(1−ρ2)
P+α2Q+2ρα
√
PQ


+
1
2
log
(
P +Q+ 1 + 2ρ
√
PQ
P +Q+ 1 +∆+ 2ρ
√
PQ
)
. (44)
Note that the first term in the expression above is maximized
when α = 1. In this case we have that
R =
1
2
log
(
(1 + ∆)(P +Q+ 1 + 2ρ
√
PQ)
P +Q+ 1 +∆+ 2ρ
√
PQ
)
(45)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
∆(P +Q+ 2ρ
√
PQ)
P +Q+ 1 +∆+ 2ρ
√
PQ
)
(46)
as required.
8To complete the proof we show that the choice α = 1 is
indeed feasible when P ≥ 1 and (P, ρ) satisfy (13).
In particular the constraint (8) requires that
h(u|s) ≥ h(u|yr)
⇒ h(x |s) ≥ h(x + s|x + s + zr)
⇒ 1
2
logP (1− ρ2) ≥ 1
2
log
(
P +Q+ 2ρ
√
PQ)
P +Q+ 1 + 2ρ
√
PQ
)
.
Rearranging,
P (1 − ρ2) ≥ 1− 1
P +Q+ 1 + 2ρ
√
PQ
≥ 1− 1
P +Q+ 1
(47)
as required.
It is worth comparing the choice of the auxiliary variable
u = x + s in the present problem with the choice of optimal
u in the dirty paper coding problem [35]. While the input x
is independent of s in [35], as illustrated in Fig. 6 the optimal
x in the secret-key problem has a component along s. This is
because scaling the interference sequence increases the secret-
key rate. Secondly recall that in [35] we find the auxiliary
codeword un that is closest to αsn where α = P
P+N . In
contrast this MMSE scaling is not performed in the secret-
key problem.
B. Proof of Prop. 3
We evaluate the upper bound in Theorem 2 for the choice
ze = zr + zδ , where zδ ∼ N (0,∆) is independent of zr.
I(s, x ; yr|ye) = h(yr|ye)− h(yr|ye, x , s)
= h(yr|ye)− h(zr|ze)
≤ 1
2
log
(
P +Q + 1 + 2
√
PQ− (P +Q+ 1 + 2
√
PQ)2
P +Q+ 1 +∆+ 2
√
PQ
)
−
− 1
2
log
(
1− 1
1 + ∆
)
where we have used the fact that the conditional entropy
h(yr|ye) is maximized by a Gaussian distribution [36]. The
above expression gives (14).
VI. SYMMETRIC CSI
We establish the secret-key capacity for the case of sym-
metric channel state information i.e., when sn is revealed to
both the transmitter and the legitimate receiver.
A. Achievability for Theorem 3
As explained in section III-C the achievability result follows
directly from Theorem 1 by replacing yr with y¯r = (yr, s)
in the lower bound expression. We nevertheless provide an
alternate scheme that only requires the knowledge of causal
CSI at the transmitter. The idea is to use a different wiretap
codebook for each realization of the state variable. In particular
suppose that S = {s1, . . . , sM} denote the set of available
states. Since the encoder and the decoder are both aware of
the state realization si and can use this common knowledge
to select the appropriate codebook for transmission. These
codebooks are constructed assuming that the eavesdropper is
also revealed the state. Suppose that we fix the distribution
pu,x|s=si(·) in (18). Let
Ri = I(u; yr|s = si)− I(u; ye|s = si) (48)
and pi = Pr(s = si). For each i = 1, 2 . . . ,M , a wiretap
codebook of length npi and rate Ri is constructed and used
to transmit a message κi. Another independent key κs of rate
Rs = H(s|ye) is then generated by exploiting the fact that sn
is not known to the eavesdropper.
1) Codebook Construction:
• For each i = 1, . . . ,M generate a codebook Ci of rate
Ri − 2εn and length ni = n(pi − εn) by sampling the
codewords i.i.d. from the distribution pu|s(·|si).
• Construct a codebook Cs where the set of all typical
sequences sn of size 2n(H(s)−2εn) is partitioned into
2n(Rs−εn) bins each containing 2n(I(s;ye)−εn) sequences.
2) Encoding:
• For each i = 1, . . . ,M the transmitter selects a random
message κi and a random codeword sequence tnii in the
corresponding in the corresponding bin of Ci.
• Upon observing s(j) = si at time t = j, it selects the
next available symbol of tnii and samples the channel
input symbol from the distribution px|s,u .
• At the end of the transmission it looks for the bin index
of sn in Cs and declares this to be κs.
• The overall secret-key is (κ1, . . . , κM , κs).
3) Decoding:
• The decoder divides ynr into subsequences
(yn11 , . . . , y
nM
M ), where the subsequences y
ni
i is
obtained by collecting the symbols of ynr when s = si.
• For i = 1, . . . ,M it searches for a codeword tnii in Ci
that is jointly typical with ynii . If no such codeword
or multiple codewords is found an error is declared.
Otherwise the bin index of tnii is taken as declared as
the message κˆi.
Through standard arguments it can be shown that the error
probability in decoding at the legitimate receiver vanishes as
n → ∞ provided we select the rates according to (48). We
omit the details due to space constraints.
4) Secrecy Analysis: First, consider splitting yne =
(yn1e1 , . . . , y
nM
eM ) where the subsequence y
nj
ej is obtained by
grouping the symbols of yne when s = sj . From the con-
struction of the wiretap codebook Cj it follows that
1
n
H(κj |ynjej ) ≥
1
n
H(κj)− εn, j = 1, . . . ,M (49)
Next since the messages are selected independently and the
encoding functions are also independent it follows that
1
n
H(κj |κ1, . . . , κj−1, κj+1, . . . , κM , yne , sn)
=
1
n
H(κj |ynej) ≥
1
n
H(κj)− εn (50)
Thus by the chain rule we have that
1
n
H(κ1, . . . , κM |yne , sn) ≥ R0 − εn (51)
9where R0 = H(κ1, . . . , κM ) = I(u; yr|s) − I(u; ye|s). To
complete the secrecy analysis we require the following addi-
tional result
Lemma 1: For any input distribution pu,x|s such that
I(u; yr|s) > I(u; ye|s) we have that
1
n
H(sn|yne ) ≥
1
n
H(s|ye)− on(1). (52)
Proof: First observe that we can write:
1
n
H(sn|yne ) =
1
n
H(yne |sn) +
1
n
H(sn)− 1
n
H(yne ) (53)
=
1
n
H(yne |sn, un) +
1
n
I(un; yne |sn) +
1
n
H(sn)− 1
n
H(yne ).
(54)
We now observe the following. Since the channel from
(un, sn)→ yne is memoryless,
1
n
H(yne |sn, un) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
H(yei|si, ui)→ H(ye|s, u) (55)
as n→∞. Next note that by construction
1
n
H(un|sn) = I(u; yr|s)− 2εn, (56)
and since I(u; yr|s) > I(u; ye|s) it follows (c.f. [37,
Lemma 1]) that2
1
n
H(un|sn, yne ) ≤ I(u; yr|s)− I(u; ye|s)− on(1) (57)
Combining the above two inequalities,
1
n
I(un; yne |sn) ≥ I(u; ye|s)− on(1) (58)
Since the sequence sn is sample i.i.d. we have
1
n
H(sn) = H(s) (59)
and finally from the chain rule
1
n
H(yne ) ≤
1
n
H(yei)→ H(ye) (60)
as n → ∞. Substituting (55), (58), (59) and (60) into (54)
completes the claim.
The secrecy analysis can be completed by combining (51)
and (52) as shown below.
1
n
H(κM1 , κs|yne ) =
1
n
H(κM1 |κs, yne ) +
1
n
H(κs|yne ) (61)
≥ 1
n
H(κM1 |sn, yne ) +
1
n
H(κs|yne ) (62)
≥ I(u; yr|s)− I(u; ye|s) + 1
n
H(κs|yne )− on(1) (63)
≥I(u; yr|s)−I(u; ye|s)+ 1
n
H(sn|yne )−
1
n
H(sn|yne , κs)−on(1)
(64)
≥ I(u; yr|s)− I(u; ye|s) +H(s|ye)− 1
n
H(sn|yne , κs)− on(1)
(65)
= I(u; yr|s)− I(u; ye|s) +H(s|ye)− on(1) (66)
2Intuitively for any typical sn, the total number of sequences un is
2nI(u;yr|s). The probability that a sequence un is jointly typical with yne
is 2−nI(u;ye|s). A precise argument involves bounding the expected size of
the list and invoking a concentration result.
where (62) and (64) follow from the fact that κs is a deter-
ministic function of sn while (63) follows by substituting (51)
and (65) follows by substituting (52) while (66) follows from
the fact that 1
n
H(sn|yne , κs) → 0 as n → ∞, since from the
construction of Cs there are at-most 2n(I(s;ye)−εn) sequences
associated with any given bin. Hence the decoder can decode
sn with high probability and hence Fano’s inequality applies.
B. Converse
For any sequence of codes indexed by the codeword length
n, we show that the secret key rate is upper bounded by the
capacity expression (18) plus a term that vanishes to zero as
the block length goes to zero. By applying the Fano inequality
on the secret-key rate, we have that for some sequence εn that
approaches zero as n goes to infinity that
nR ≤ I(κ; l) + nεn ≤ I(κ; sn, ynr ) + nεn (67)
where the last step follows from the data processing inequality
since l = hn(sn, ynr ). Furthermore from the secrecy condition
I(κ; yne ) ≤ nεn and hence,
nR ≤ I(κ; sn, ynr )− I(κ; yne ) + 2nεn (68)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(κ; yri, si|y i−1e ynr,i+1, sni+1)− I(κ; ye,i|y i−1e ynr,i+1, sni+1),
(69)
where the second step follows from the Csiszar sum-
identity [30, Chapter 2] applied to difference of mutual infor-
mations. The derivation is analogous to [26] and is omitted.
If we let vi = (y i−1e ynr,i+1, sni+1) and ui = (κ, vi) note that
vi → ui → (xi, si)→ (yr,i, ye,i) holds. Maximizing over each
term in the summation we obtain that
R ≤ max
pu,v,x
I(u; yr, s|v)− I(u; ye|v) + 2εn (70)
= max
pu,x
I(u; yr, s)− I(u; ye) + 2εn (71)
where the second step follows from the fact that the max-
imizing over v is redundant since (70) involves a convex
combination of I(u; yr, s|v = vi) − I(u; ye|v = vi) and
hence we can replace with the term that results in the largest
value. We recover (18) from (71) by using an approach similar
to (20).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We study the secret key agreement capacity over a wiretap
channel controlled by a state parameter. Lower and upper
bounds on the capacity are established when the state sequence
is known noncausally to the encoder. The lower bound is
obtained by creating a common reconstruction sequence at
the legitimate terminals and binning the set of reconstruction
sequences to generate a secret key. When evaluated for the
Gaussian case (secret-key from dirty paper) our bounds co-
incide in the high SNR and high INR regimes and the gap
between the two bounds is always less than 0.5 bits. We
also observe that the rates for secret-key agreement can be
significantly higher than that proposed for the secret message
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transmission problem. We also extend our earlier [2] results
on symmetric CSI to the general case of asymmetric CSI.
A complete characterization of the secret-key capacity is
obtained for the case of symmetric channel state information
i.e., when the state sequence is known to both the encoder
and the decoder. In this case we also present another coding
scheme that involves multiplexed wiretap codebooks and only
requires causal knowledge of the state sequence at the encoder.
The capacity expression also captures an interesting tradeoff
between correlating the input with the state sequence to max-
imize the contribution of the wiretap codebook and masking
the state sequence from the eavesdropper. We illustrate this
with a numerical example.
In terms of future work it will be interesting to study
the secret key agreement capacity when there is only causal
state information available to the transmitter. While this paper
establishes the capacity when there is symmetric CSI at
both the legitimate terminals, the more general problem of
two-sided CSI remains to be explored. In another direction,
secret key agreement protocols also appear to be an important
component in more general problems. For example in [28]
the authors independently developed a secret-key agreement
scheme as a building block in characterizing a secret message
and secret key tradeoff for wiretap channels with correlated
sources. Another recent work [27] studies the problem of se-
cret message transmission on wiretap channel with symmetric
CSI and uses a block Markov encoding scheme that generates
a secret key in each block [2]. Exploring such connections is
an interesting direction for future research.
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